La inteligencia como organización burocrática: disfunciones del modelo weberiano

Palabras clave: burocracia, gestión, organización gubernamental, seguridad del Estado, servicios de inteligencia

Resumen

Si bien el desarrollo histórico de los servicios de inteligencia durante el siglo XX fue altamente dispar, desde una aproximación comparativa se observa que gran parte de las comunidades de inteligencia de regímenes políticos democráticos mantienen hoy en su estructura y funcionamiento grandes semejanzas, producto de una institucionalización determinada por el modelo de organización burocrática de tipo weberiano. Así, este artículo busca comprender los aspectos organizacionales de los servicios de inteligencia desde la perspectiva de la racionalidad burocrática, con el propósito de explorar las críticas a este modelo y evaluar su relación con las disfunciones en el ámbito particular de los servicios de inteligencia. Los resultados muestran que estas distorsiones afectan la funcionalidad y la legitimidad de estas organizaciones, lo que muestra la necesidad de buscar cambios del modelo actual.

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Biografía del autor/a

Álvaro Cremades-Guisado, Universidad Nebrija, España

Profesor de la Universidad Nebrija y estudiante del Doctorado en Ciencias Políticas y de la Administración y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

Henry Cancelado-Franco, Escuela Superior de Guerra “General Rafael Reyes Prieto”, Bogotá D.C., Colombia

Estudiante del Doctorado en Ciencia Política de la Universidad de los Andes. Magíster en análisis de problemas contemporáneos de la Universidad Externado de Colombia y politólogo de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Es profesor e investigador en la Escuela Superior de Guerra.

Cómo citar
Cremades-Guisado, Álvaro, & Cancelado-Franco, H. (2021). La inteligencia como organización burocrática: disfunciones del modelo weberiano. Revista Científica General José María Córdova, 19(34), 479-496. https://doi.org/10.21830/19006586.701

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Publicado
2021-04-01
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