Cómo terminan las insurgencias

En busca de la victoria del gobierno

Palabras clave: Acuerdo de paz; centrado en el enemigo; centrado en la población; estancamiento; estrategia de contrainsurgencia; victoria militar


Actualmente, la insurgencia es el tipo de guerra más frecuente. Sin embargo, el éxito en la guerra irregular no puede cuantificarse y medirse con absoluta certeza. Este documento examina cómo terminan las insurgencias y cómo un gobierno puede lograr el escenario óptimo: la victoria militar. Una insurgencia podría terminar de tres maneras: una victoria (militar) para los insurgentes o el régimen, un acuerdo de paz o un estancamiento. La guerra, no obstante, evoluciona constantemente; por lo tanto, los tres escenarios anteriores pueden manifestarse durante el curso de una insurgencia. En consecuencia, el Estado debe implementar una mezcla equilibrada de reformas y represión: una política dependiente de la situación, que incluya una gobernanza justa y apoyo externo, que garantice el bienestar y la seguridad de la población y que sea respaldada por una narrativa adecuada.


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Biografía del autor/a

Spyridon Plakoudas, Academia Rabdan, Emiratos Árabes Unidos

Profesor Asistente de Seguridad Nacional en la Academia Rabdan, becario de investigación postdoctoral en la Universidad de Macedonia, Tesalónica y profesor adjunto en el Hellenic National Defense College. Anteriormente fue profesor adjunto en la Universidad de Panteion. Tiene un doctorado en estudios de guerra de la Universidad de Reading.

Cómo citar
Plakoudas, S. (2019). Cómo terminan las insurgencias. Revista Científica General José María Córdova, 17(28), 923-938. https://doi.org/10.21830/19006586.523


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