Insistiendo en la victoria
Victoria versus éxito en guerras limitadas y asimétricas
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21830/19006586.522Palabras clave:
Conflicto intraestatal; derrota militar; éxito; insurgencia; guerra asimétrica; guerra civil; terrorismo; victoriaResumen
El uso del término victoria para referirse a una derrota militar del enemigo en una campana COIN es problemático. Una revisión del conflicto Turquía-PKK revela que, tras la búsqueda de una victoria militar unilateral por Turquía, el PKK llevo a cabo una campana sociopolítica más amplia, basándose en una guerra asimétrica e indirecta. La victoria militar no concluyó el conflicto exitosamente, solo cambio su naturaleza. Por lo tanto, sugerimos que éxito es un mejor concepto para evaluar las campanas de contrainsurgencia. Este se enfoca en soluciones políticas y cambia la percepción de una victoria unilateral a un resultado favorable para las partes. Por último, referirse a las fases consumadas exitosamente con dicho termino es más preciso, ya que el resultado en COIN no es simplemente una victoria o una derrota.
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