La guerra irregular, insurgencias y cómo contrarrestarlas
Una perspectiva comparativa entre los enfoques centrados en el enemigo y en la población
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21830/19006586.497Palabras clave:
Clausewitz; COIN; contrainsurgencia centrada en el enemigo; contrainsurgencia centrada en la población; estrategia; guerra contemporánea; guerra irregular; guerras pequeñasResumen
Este artículo toma el debate actual entre los enfoques centrados en el enemigo y los centrados en la población como un punto de partida para hacer su contribución, cambiando el enfoque del ámbito operacional y táctico al estratégico. Con este fin, rastrea los significados de cada enfoque desde sus orígenes históricos, discutiendo los fundamentos teóricos para destilar los principios básicos y evaluar hasta qué punto cada uno es adecuado para contrarrestar una insurgencia. El argumento central de este artículo es que, si bien ambos enfoques tienen “filosofías” diferentes, son dos caras de la misma moneda. Por lo tanto, lo que se debe tener en cuenta es la dimensión estratégica y, lógicamente, la política, al referirse a la contrainsurgencia ya que los dos serán determinantes en el enfoque que se emplee.
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