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Cooperative security as a European Union prevention and response measure

Seguridad cooperativa como medida de prevención y respuesta de la Unión Europea

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ABSTRACT. Europe has experienced the most prolonged period of peace in its history since the Second World War. However, this “calmness” has been interrupted by contemporary terrorist attacks. Today, to be considered a political actor, the European Union needs to be strong, capable of defining and strengthening its collective foreign security and defense policy. Two lines are presented for a new regional security system. NATO and the EU, two organizations that integrate liberal democracies with common interests, and an organization with a less inclusive vocation, derived from the CSCE (currently OSCE) to be a meeting point and create trust among its members. With these scenarios, the aim is to deal with security issues, maintain peace, and avoid the use of force.

KEYWORDS: CSCE; defense; European Union; NATO; OSCE; peace; security policies

RESUMEN. Europa ha vivido el periodo de paz más extenso de su historia desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Sin embargo, esta “tranquilidad” ha sido interrumpida por los ataques terroristas contemporáneos. Hoy se necesita una Unión Europea fuerte, capaz de delimitar y fortalecer su política exterior, seguridad y defensa común para considerarse un actor político. Se presentan dos líneas para un nuevo sistema de seguridad para la región: dos organizaciones que integran las democracias liberales con intereses comunes (OTAN y UE). Además, una organización con una vocación menos inclusiva generada a partir de la CSCE (actualmente OSCE), para servir de punto de encuentro y crear la confianza entre sus miembros. Con estos escenarios, se busca tratar los asuntos de seguridad, mantener la paz y evitar el uso de la fuerza.

PALABRAS CLAVE: CSCE; defensa; OSCE; OTAN; paz; políticas de seguridad; Unión Europea

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Introduction

The attacks occurred in Europe in the last decade have produced a perception of insecurity and genuine threat in citizens and politicians who did not have security as a critical issue on their agendas, despite its significance in guaranteeing stability and development (“Los principales atentados en Europa,” 2017). It is just that, when terror arrives at a state’s doorstep, the most important thing is to have a fundamental pillar that protects and ensures the population’s state of welfare, something that the EU does not have. Thus, Europe faces the question of what to do, of reconsidering the order of security in its periphery and finding the means to achieve the desired end. This is a time when the existence of the European Union is being called into question when the objectives to be pursued are not entirely clear. However, today more than ever, European citizens need a strong Europe.

According to the European Commission’s report (2017a),¹ security is one of the three priorities of greatest concern to the Union’s citizens. More than 75% of Europeans are in favor of creating a common defense (Parlamento Europeo, 2017). On this issue, the Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker has stated that “the right to feel safe and secure in one’s own home is the most basic and universal right of all.” (Juncker, 2017, §3)

Currently, Europe is demanding adaptable and suitable security and defense policies. Personnel with extensive knowledge in multiple fields and disciplines are needed to understand the international network, aspects among the actors involved must be considered to produce security and defense policies responding to the dynamics of the threats. To this end, it is necessary to “define a coherent strategy that identifies, based on risk analysis, the objectives to be achieved, the way to do it, and the resources needed to do it.” (Ceseden, 2018, p. 5)

Thus, European organizations and institutions involved in security and defense are in the midst of political debate. In recent years, all the European states have been redefining their security strategies and presenting them in the form of defense white papers (Soto, 2016) or national security strategies (Gobierno de España, 2017) in an effort towards “defending their own approaches to security” (Ceseden, 2018, p. 5). The driving issue of this debate on European security is deciding where to locate the center of gravity, either in the east or in the south of Europe (Ceseden, 2018).

This discussion “is very important for the future of Europe’s defense, and also for the security of the states, as it is about deciding where to place Europe’s strategic

1 The European Commission is a politically independent executive body of the EU. It is the only body responsible for drawing up proposals for new European legislation and implementing the decisions of the European Parliament and the Council of the EU (Comisión Europea, 2018).

priorities and, consequently, where to exercise the main effort of Europe's defense and to allocate resources." (Ceseden, 2018, p. 5)

The end of the Cold War has given way to the need to reconfigure European security based on the respect for the will of nations, understanding, and stability, and in a broader sense, on the respect for individual freedom and liberal democracy. In Europe, the pursuit of establishing these principles has apparently followed two paths, a) the institutional construction of a system or organization, and b) the construction of trust based on dialogue and collaboration without integrative counterparts; the NATO and the EU models in contrast to, or rather alongside, the CSCE/OSCE model.

Both models, as will be seen below, have had disparate growth and evolution and have been perceived differently by the protagonists in the construction of European security.

The future of security and defense in the European Union

Europe has attempted to attain a common defense for decades, even before the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC). However, neither the failed European Defence Community (EDC) nor the Western European Union (WEU)² has been able to fulfill this aspiration. On the international scene, the future of European defense is a confusing issue, everything will depend, among other aspects, on the evolution of two fundamental factors, a) the political will of the EU member countries, and b) the capabilities they have at their disposal (Ceseden, 2018).

Since its creation, through the Treaty of Rome (Unión Europea, 2018), the EEC had been self-marginalized in military security and defense matters. These matters were delegated first to NATO and in a more indirect way to the WEU, which, at a certain point, came to be considered as the "defense arm" of the EU. In Europe, the political will to create a common defense strategy does not have unanimous or even majority approval (Ceseden, 2018).

The issue is that future advancements in the area of common defense will depend more on the political will of the states than on ambiguous constitutional provisions (Ceseden, 2018). Today, there is a fairly widespread consensus within the EU that European defense should remain the responsibility of the Atlantic Alliance. However, as an organization, the EU establishes the order in terms of security and defense to relieve the obligatory dependence on extra-European states. The EU needs to have well-defined interests and the imperative to look after them.

2 Western Europe consists of ten countries, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland.

Global European Security Strategy

Five priorities are established in the European Global Security Strategy (EGSE) (Unión Europea, 2018) that provide an approach based on values and interests and not ideology. This different approach arises as a result of the latest terrorist attacks that have brought about a new security awareness in Europe, as well as France's invocation, in November 2015, of the mutual assistance clause ("Así es la cláusula de defensa colectiva invocada por Francia". 2018), contained in Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union³, something that was unheard of until then.

"It is no longer a question of defining a *secure Europe in a better world*, as the previous strategy indicated, but the need to create a stronger Europe in circumstances where *our union is threatened*, as the new one states" (Ceseden, 2018, p. 18). Thus, EU security becomes a foremost task that implies creating a projection and protection capacity that strengthens the EU's crisis management structures and offers them the appropriate civil and military capabilities, including the rational and synergic strengthening of the defense industry (Ceseden, 2018).

The document changes its vision of the EU's neighborhood; it does not seek to "promote a set of well-governed countries, as was the case in 2003, but rather to reinforce the strength of states and their societies, without having to impose a European model that relies on local actors" (Ceseden, 2018, p. 18). This change of direction, with an outward focus, is closely related to the migration crisis. Therefore, a new migration policy is being implemented in the EU, where agreements have been reached with five African countries, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal (Comisión Europea, 2016). An external investment plan has also been established to stimulate the economies of migrants' countries of origin and transit. It is important to stress that this new direction implies an amendment to the agreements to secure the interests of the European Union (Consejo Europeo de la Unión Europea, n.d.-a).

On the other hand, regarding the action-oriented *political policy instruments*, the last chapter of the *vision for action* shows unprecedented progress over previous documents because it sets out a road map to implement the strategy (Ceseden, 2018). The Bratislava Summit of September 16, 2016, the first to be held by 27 states (minus the United Kingdom), represented further progress in this direction (Consejo de Europa, 2016).

3 Article 42.7: "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. (Comisión Europea, 2017b; Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea, 2018).

At the political level, the EGSE has driven a general consensus on the need to guarantee the development of peoples –the facts show that the guarantee of security is not possible without development– because violence is too often generated precisely by this lack of development. For example, the lack of democratic governments, sustainable development, education, work, and basic resources, etc. Europe must, therefore, increase its level of security by implementing a change of consciousness, ceding its sovereignty to the EU, and increasing the budget allocated to security and defense.

The High Representative arrived with a strategy that had been worked on for many months at a time of severe institutional crisis for Europe, due to the separation of the United Kingdom from the EU after Brexit. Her reception was not very warm, but the recommendations and the progress of the negotiations are placing the EGSE as a protagonist in terms of serving as a point of union in a fragile Europe that seemed to be breaking down. The EGSE shows the guidelines to reach a certain strategic autonomy and towards a solid Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). (Ceseden, 2018, pp. 19-20)

The EGSE provides mechanisms for cooperation between the two organizations, each one in its field of action. It establishes the guidelines to move from being consumers to security providers, which is still an arduous task. However, Europe has the means, the capacities, and the will to achieve, together with NATO, greater strategic autonomy and avoid duplications.

European Union measures to improve terrorist action prevention and response capabilities

The EU, supported by the different agencies and organizations involved in security, has proposed a series of measures to improve the capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorist actions that affect different sectors of society. On the budgetary side, the European Commission directly manages part of the Internal Security Fund (ISF), which, by 2017, had almost tripled its budget. In that year, it defined the fight against terrorism, organized crime, cybercrime, operational cooperation, and information exchange as priority areas (Comisión Europea, 2017b).

In response to the 2004 attacks in Spain, in 2005, the Council adopted the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, for a safer Europe and the fight against terrorism worldwide. After a tense calm, in the last three years, with no major terrorist actions on European soil, the current situation makes the fight against terrorism a priority for the EU, its Member States, and its partners. This strategy rests on four pillars, prevention, protection, prosecution, and response. Its development relies on cooperation with international institutions and third countries. The prevention addresses the causes that give rise to radicalization and recruitment (Ardila & Pinedo, 2013). To this end, the Council drafted an *EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and*

Recruitment to Terrorism in 2008. It was revised in 2014 to address the new phenomena of the self-radicalized and the use of social networks for terrorist purposes (Consejo Europeo, n.d.-b).

Another EU priority is “The protection of citizens and infrastructure and the reduction of vulnerability to attacks” (Consejo Europeo, n.d.-b); this includes strengthening security at external borders and improving transport safety. In this regard, in 2016, the EU adopted the directive regulating “the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data”⁴ (Consejo Europeo, n.d.-b), which took effect in 2018.

The EU pursues terrorism by seeking to diminish its capacity to act. To this end, it has focused its efforts on strengthening national capabilities, improving judicial and police cooperation, combating funding, and using media and support.

This response aims to prepare, manage, and minimize the consequences of terrorist action by setting up crisis response arrangements, reviewing civil protection mechanisms, developing risk assessment systems, and developing a common policy for assistance to the victims of terrorism.

Because terrorism today is a transnational threat that goes beyond the borders of the EU, the strategy to combat it requires close cooperation with international partners, in particular with neighboring states. This cooperation takes the form of high-level dialogues, cooperation or assistance clauses, and agreements and capacity-building projects with strategic countries⁵.

Cooperation with the United States (US) has intensified significantly in recent years through agreements in the “areas of terrorist financing, transport and borders, mutual legal assistance, and extradition. The US authorities now cooperate increasingly closely with Europol and Eurojust” (Consejo Europeo, 2018, 5 *idem* a).

The EU also cooperates with other international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, as well as regional organizations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the Islamic Cooperation Organization, and the League of Arab States.

The region cannot allow criminal and terrorist organizations to consolidate their operations on European territory, especially given the strengthening of illegal activities in the form of criminal geopolitics (Jiménez & Acosta, 2018).

In this respect, the EU Commission conveyed a package of operational and practical counter-terrorism measures to help Member States address the vulnerabilities that have emerged as a result of terrorist attacks on European soil. These measures consist of: a) Supporting Member States in the protection of public spaces; b) Closing the space where terrorists can operate, further restricting access to explosives and their pre-

4 The PNR is the personal information that passengers provide airlines at the time of ticket purchase.

5 Countries of the Western Balkans, Sahel, North Africa, Horn of Africa, North America, and Asia

cursors; c) Improving cross-border access to financial information; d) Improving EU-wide preparedness, response and coordination in the event of an incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) substances; (e) Supporting police and judicial authorities against encryption by criminals of computer equipment in criminal investigations and enabling interoperability of police bases; (f) Establishing steps to counter radicalization; and (g) Strengthening the EU's external action in the fight against terrorism. (Presidencia del Gobierno, 2017)

The repeated terrorist actions in public spaces against soft targets have led the EU to finance, with more than 118 million euros by 2018, a series of measures that aim to prevent this type of action and reduce its consequences.

These measures consist of the organization of police forums and courses to share experience and best practices, seminars involving public or private stakeholders (mayors of major cities), the development of guidance material, and standards for the physical protection of buildings (stations, airports, etc.), specific events or locations (concerts, sporting events, etc.), as well as the investment of funds to improve detection methods (technologies and use of dogs) and the design and planning of buildings and public spaces to make them safer.

Furthermore, the Commission considers it essential to control means of transport as a target, as well as a means of carrying out attacks. It is evaluating security measures in roads, rail, air, and ship transport in order to prevent such attacks.

Although the 2013 regulation on explosives precursors included new restrictions on the acquisition of chemical material that can be used for the homemade manufacture of explosives, recent terrorist attacks have shown that it is necessary to assess whether the measures adopted in the regulation are adequate to achieve their objectives. Therefore, the EU has urged Member States (MS) to carry out an assessment and propose the measures they deem necessary for implementation in the Regulation (Parlamento Europeo, 2013).

Improving cross-border access to financial information, through reliable and accurate financial data, can improve the identification of terrorists and their connections, outline the logistical layout of suspects, and map their networks. An overview of the financial activity of suspects can provide crucial information to prevent or respond to actions.

Thus, the European Commission is considering options to improve cooperation between Financial Information Units (FIU), as well as the possibility of facilitating access to financial data within an MS by establishing central bank account records or data retrieval systems accessible to FIU. Also, the Commission is preparing an initiative to extend law enforcement access to bank account records and financial transaction data in other EU jurisdictions for anti-terrorism investigations.

Although the CBRN threat, which the EU addressed in 2009 through a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear action plan, is considered to be of low probability, the force of its impact would be very high. Therefore, the action plan has been reformulated to increase coordination and information exchange measures within this constantly evolving field. Moreover, a common training plan has been developed for first responders (FSC, civil, and health) with the participation of the different institutions involved, such as Europol, NATO, and Frontex, among others.

The encryption of computer devices is an obstacle to investigations by the police and judicial authorities. To overcome these obstacles, the European Commission has provided Europol with the Internet Referral Unit (IRU). The Commission has also taken a new approach to interoperability to make information systems compatible and interoperable.

Recent attacks have highlighted the importance of preventive action on the radicalization of residents in EU territory. Aware of this threat, in July 2017, the Commission set up the High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalization to improve coordination and cooperation between stakeholders in preparation for the creation of an EU Center for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (Unión Europea, 2017). The effort to counter online radicalization has fallen on the IRU, through the EU Internet Forum, with the assistance of representatives from the Internet industry, to assess progress and propose future action.

Finally, the foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) phenomenon requires the bolstering of the EU's external action in cooperation with third countries. The use of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) stands out because of its importance for data consultation and intelligence generation in the fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime.

Integrated within the European Counter Terrorism Center (ECTC) are the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) and Europol's Counter Terrorism Joint Liaison Team (CT-JLT). The latter was created in 2016, with the participation of thirteen MS and three third countries⁶, to support operations adapted to the needs of MS, streamline the exchange of operational information, link directly to MS counter-terrorism investigation authorities and explain the support available from the ECTC to national authorities.

The creation of Europol's IRU in July 2015 extended the agency's support capabilities to the virtual space. The closure of websites and removal of articles for their terrorist content, with a success rate of 85%, represents a new field of action, which could not be covered until now because of the difficulty arising from the internationalization of the different network service providers.

6 Written data 6146/18, Council of the European Union.

In 2017, Europol launched the Shaping Internet Research Investigations Unified System (SIRIUS) to support MS in the evaluation and analysis of Internet communications. The competence of this system is demonstrated by the nearly 500 members from different law enforcement agencies in 30 countries that are members of SIRIUS and use the system's databases and tools one year after it became operational.

Since 2016, Europol has integrated the FIU.net system to improve the exchange of data between the Member States' financial intelligence units (FIU). Through FIU.net, national FIU can communicate and check their FIU to FIU data in real-time against high-value targets in Europol databases.

Continuing with the latest steps taken by Europol, it is worth noting the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Program Board (CTPB) in 2017, which convened a meeting of European police chiefs. With the ECTC, the CTPB provides a joint approach to approximate future scenarios, bringing together police chiefs with operational capacity for action against terrorism on the web, information exchange, and nodes between organized crime and terrorism, etc.

To cover all the fields of terrorist action, in October 2017, the European Commission presented a CBRN10 action plan proposing the development of a CBRN knowledge center within the ECTC.

Cooperative Security Concept: Permanent Structured Cooperation

Most authors agree on tracing the origins of the concept back to the end of the 18th century, when Emmanuel Kant, in his work *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795/2016), defined what, for him, must be the second definitive article of perpetual peace; he states, "The law of nations must be based on a society of free states" (p. 58). In this book, Kant introduces the concept of a society of nations not understood as a "State of Nations," but as a *Federation of Peoples* that would curb the perverse and unjust tendencies of nations.

This precedent drives us to firmly anchor the international view of global society, which will be one of the hallmarks of cooperative security. The first steps in this direction were institutionalized cooperation, which comes with the *Concert of Europe*. After the end of the Napoleonic wars, the winning powers, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain, decided to hold regular conferences to deal with matters relating to security in Europe. France joined this group in 1818, and the system remained active until 1914 with the outbreak of World War I.

The next step in the theoretical evolution of the international security system was the emergence of the concept of collective security. It emerged after the First World War as an attempt to avoid repeating the errors that led to that conflict. The

pact that gave rise to the League of Nations (1919) established that the purpose of the League was to promote cooperation between nations, guarantee peace and security, base international relations on justice, and honor and observe the requirements of international law. It is evident that some states have been formally and lastingly committed to protecting the security interests of other states. The founding treaty contemplated provisions to achieve a reduction in armaments, procedures to resolve disputes without resorting to war, and principles of action in the event of conflicts between members of society or with a non-member state, all of which can be clearly identified with what we shall see as the foundations of Cooperative Security.

Overall, the League's most important aspect is the emergence of the concept of collective security (Sociedad de Naciones, 1919) by which an aggression against one of the members of the League of Nations, from one or more other members or a third state, would have a response, even an armed one, from the other member States.

Several reasons influenced its failure, but the one that interests us for this work is the existence at its core of liberal democracies alongside totalitarian states and the absence of the United States as a world order power. The outbreak of the Second World War implied its effective dissolution, which was formally verified in 1946.

The United Nations Organization was born as the heir of the League of Nations. Its purpose (ONU, 1945) was to prevent war by establishing a firm commitment to "fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and the equal rights of men and women and the equal rights of all nations" (ONU, n.d.). Moreover, to create conditions for maintaining justice and respect for treaties and international law. Uniquely, the promotion of social progress and the elevation of the standard of living and freedom, practicing tolerance, living together in peace, working for the maintenance of international peace and security, avoiding the use of armed force, and using this organization as an international mechanism to promote the economic and social progress of all peoples also appear.

Chapters V and VI of the Charter of the United Nations provide for the peaceful settlement of disputes and, where necessary, the use of force for their solution.

This is an organization that is once again linked to the concept of *collective security*, but which has clearly evolved concerning the human aspects of international security, an actual embryo of what will later be known as *human security*. The fundamental rights, human dignity, equality, justice, progress, and coexistence appear as objectives alongside the preservation and maintenance of peace and security proper to *collective security*.

The Charter of the United Nations does not merely state these objectives of human security⁷; it introduces provisions relating to *international economic and social*

7 This concept was proposed by Ul Haq in the 1994 Human Development Report (PNUD, 1994).

cooperation and the organization of the Economic and Social Council (Chapters IX and X of the Charter) (ONU, 1945).

Article 55 of the Charter recognizes that for peaceful and friendly relations among peoples to exist, there must be stability and well-being, which are achieved by offering higher standards of living, access to employment, and economic and social progress and development. It considers the existence of specialized agencies –a true novelty– with powers to promote these objectives, providing them protection within the organization, through the Economic and Social Council. The express mention of the inquiries that can be made to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) is worth mentioning.

The advent of the bipolar world in the immediate post-war period and the beginning of the Cold War gave rise to the emergence of two organizations that were to give birth to a new concept in security matters, collective defense. These organizations were NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Both organizations had a clause whereby an attack on one of the members would be considered an attack on all of the members, and these could come to its defense. Other less notable organizations had similar clauses; however, the most significant are the ones mentioned above.

Although NATO is a defensive military alliance, it has a prominent political component. Its founding treaty reflects a vocation to build security based on human security values, very much in line with those of the United Nations Charter. However, it has a clear commitment to democracy, individual freedoms, and the rule of law (OTAN, 1949), besides the mentioned collective defense clause.

A few years later, and without any initial will in military matters, the European Union is born. This eminently political and economic organization's objective is to achieve the political union of its members. It contemplates the same commitment to human security (without having a doctrine from the HS approach) and democratic values, individual freedoms, and the rule of law as NATO. However, its vision is more ambitious in terms of the relations to be created between its member states.

The European Union Treaty, for its part, is developed as part of this process of political union in which "a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense" (Unión Europea, 1992) is progressively developed, including a collective defense clause (Art. 42.7; Iglesias-Velasco, 2006).

Thus, we see that collective defense, in this referred area, occurs in two organizations; one is military, although with an important political component, and the other is eminently political and economical, although with aspirations of creating a common security policy, including military aspects. The members of both organizations

are democratic states that demonstrate their commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and respect for individual freedoms.

We have seen the evolution of the concept of security in which Kant's ideas on the *federation of peoples* have shaped since the development of collective security, with the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and the UN, to NATO's collective defense. In parallel, the concern for individuals has been consolidated in these organizations, which have gradually included human development, progress, raising the standard of living, and other factors affecting civil society and individuals in their objectives. These organizations are becoming increasingly important in the face of the previous omnipresence of States. Finally, we must speak of an organization that was not born with the desire to be an organization, and the originality of its approach makes it worthy of mention, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which initially had the format of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Conference began its work in 1972, at the height of the Cold War, and under the auspices of the Charter of the United Nations. It was intended to serve as a forum in which all the states of Europe, the United States, and Canada could try to resolve their security problems, on an equal footing, without resorting to the use of force.

The OSCE also began with a social agenda, which was intended to supplement the trust and relationships created through dialogues on security. Its originality is that it seeks to achieve this security not through a "federation of peoples," which would entail a degree of integration, which is unachievable and not intended in the CSCE/OSCE, but through a "federation of wills," product of cooperation.

Permanent Structured Cooperation

The "necessary advancement and development of Permanent Structured Cooperation, [hereinafter PSC], is a mechanism that was introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007" (Ceseden, 2018, p. 20), which had not been implemented until now, probably because the need had not been recognized in the absence of real "threats" such as those we currently face (Cooperación Estructurada Permanente, 2018; Ceseden, 2018, p. 20).

This type of cooperation opens the door to a series of mechanisms with which enormous progress can be made in the construction and development of the CSDP, especially as established in Articles 42.6 and 46 of the Lisbon Treaty, identifying those countries that are willing to participate in the development of capabilities and the deployment of European military missions, more quickly and closely. (Ceseden, 2018, pp. 20-21)

This statement suggests that its main intention is to establish the common elements of the 27 Member States to achieve the imperative objective of increasing European military capabilities by adding and bringing together the capabilities of the states belonging to the Union (Ceseden, 2018).

Already in the Rome Declaration, there was talk of a “Union committed to strengthening its common security and defense, also in cooperation and complementarity with NATO, considering the national circumstances and legal commitments [Comisión Europea, 2017]; an active Union in the United Nations committed to a multilateral system based on rules, proud of its values and protective of its people.” (Ceseden, 2018, p. 21)

The European Common Security Policy and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Mogherini has made it clear in successive statements that the development of the [CSDP] will only take place together with [NATO], but he also points out in the [EGSE] that it is desirable that member states should be ‘better equipped, trained, and organized to contribute decisively to such collective efforts.’ (Ceseden, 2018, p. 31)

Other than in their interests, NATO and the EU are dissimilar and differ from each other in several ways. First, it is possible to identify a geographical factor. NATO is made up of several EU countries. However, the presence of other nations in the Atlantic Alliance, mainly the United States as an innate leader and maximum contributor in economic matters, brings up the vast difference between the interests and capacities that are denoted between the two organizations. The EU must be concerned about the countries around it and develop its autonomy complemented by NATO (Ceseden, 2018).

Precisely because both organizations share a good number of countries (21 of the 27), both must complement each other; this implies the non-duplication of elements. Indeed, many of the voices that are raised against Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) and against the idea of developing the CSDP do so mainly by referring to this possible NATO-EU duplication, and to the impossibility of genuine strategic autonomy that the High Representative so much defends. Not only that, but the problem with Cyprus and Turkey is also pointed out, as they prevent the cooperation that the EU is currently carrying out with the Atlantic Alliance in terms of defense capacity building or hybrid warfare, among others. (Ceseden, 2018, p. 31)

As a result, following Mogherini’s statement (2018), the Cooperation to be carried out with NATO was expressed at the July 2017 meetings of the defense ministers of the countries interested in the PSC (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain). The

previous, to guarantee the strategic autonomy between Europe and NATO, however, knowing that cooperation with NATO is currently essential to guarantee the defense of member states and security at a continental and global level (Ceseden, 2018).

Firstly, the Eastern countries themselves, those of the Visegrad⁸ and the Baltic countries⁹, rely far more on the defense that NATO can provide against Russia than on the capabilities of the EU. These countries have seen Russia's role in the Crimea¹⁰ and EU action that has not gone beyond sanctions. With an opponent like Putin, the countries of the East do not want to settle for the EU alone but prefer to be under the umbrella of NATO. That is why there are soldiers deployed in Latvia under NATO command. To do without it would mean a sharp division within the EU that would only harm its role in the world and put stones in the CSDP cart. (Ceseden, 2018, p. 31)

According to Ruiz & Barroso (2009), it is imperative to emphasize that the foundations of the relationship between both organizations are grounded in their complementarity. If the decision was made to participate in the PSC, the potential withdrawal of EU and NATO member states "may be presented as a serious challenge to be overcome." (Ruiz & Barroso, 2009, p. 57)

On the other hand, it is important to point out that Europe, or the nations that comprise the Union, do not intend to compete with NATO. They do not intend to be a competition or replace the Atlantic Alliance. Instead, they mean to have capabilities that allow for the resolution of crises or problems in an autonomous and also complementary manner. The objective is to obtain the possibility to act independently, without the need to invoke NATO's resources, acknowledging the existing blockage or suspicion of the states of the eastern zone (Ceseden, 2018).

NATO is primarily a collective defense organization. Although it also has the missions of crisis management and cooperative security. The EU, on the other hand, is a multinational, global organization that represents a community of values born in Robert Schuman's Christian humanism and embodied in the way Europe is understood. Therefore, the EU and NATO, today, remain complementary. (Ceseden, 2018, p. 32)

Cooperative security as a strategic system

Besides its study as an evolution of the concept of security, another approach that can be made to cooperative security is a system in itself to be implemented in an area. In this case, it would not be enough to determine how we have arrived at cooperative

8 Alliance of four Central European countries: Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

9 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

10 Politically, the Crimea is currently disputed territory between Russia and Ukraine. The Russian Empire conquered the peninsula in 1774 in the Turkish-Russian War and incorporated it into the Khanate of Crimea, to be integrated into the Empire in 1783.

security and what characterizes it most. We will have to determine a starting point, an objective or final situation, and the lines to be followed to achieve a system based on cooperative security.

At its core, this system will have a group of nations that share the values of liberal democracy and their respect for human rights. Although these nations, as we shall see, will maintain contacts with other countries in which the democratic system is not implanted, the nucleus will have to be formed solely by liberal democracies because they are the only ones that can be committed to the maintenance and dissemination of these values, which will be a common objective set and maintained in the long term.

Another important aspect of the cooperative security system is the creation of a security network between nations, which will include political consultations, free trade agreements, coordination of foreign and security policies, and the creation of multinational military units, among others.

They must also have the method in place for resolving differences without resorting to violent methods. This high degree of interrelationship on security issues may, in some cases, lead the nations that make up the core of the cooperative security system to nuance or modify their individual national interests in favor of shared interests. These shifts will be based on the conviction that breaking consensus may entail greater problems than those arising from personal renunciation to uphold the common position.

Two security rings will be developed based on the interrelations of this core of countries concerning democratic values, interests, and shared common positions.

The first ring is collective security, aimed at preventing aggression between the states in the cooperative security system. This collective security is also materialized through cooperation in matters such as the fight against terrorism, organized crime, illegal immigration, drugs, or environmental risks. As a result, the states that make up the system will have the certainty that their differences will be resolved peacefully.

The next ring is the commitment to collective defense, which translates into a solidarity-based response by all the members to aggression by a state outside the system against one or more of its members.

Collective security provides a kind of security from within, preventing conflicts between the nations of the system, while collective security provides the system of nations with protection against external aggression.

Lastly, the cooperative security system will actively promote security and stability beyond its borders, that is, the geographical area in which it is included, and where any destabilization or conflict may threaten the security of the core of nations that form the system.

The means to obtain this stability will be the recourse to politics, economic relations, public information policy, active diplomacy, and, ultimately, the use of force.

According to this conception of cooperative security as a system, and in line with the issues raised in this study, the arrangement of Canada and the United States in North America and the nations of Europe could form cooperative security systems, with NATO and the European Union at their core; this would allow for the elimination of conflicts between them and provide stability to the North Atlantic and Eurasian region.

The future of the EU's regional security area

In 2004, the European Union launched its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), aimed at achieving the stabilization, security, and prosperity of the EU's southern and eastern neighbors, following the EU's Global Strategy.

The ENP, which is aimed towards strengthening common ties and interests with nations and organizations in the regions concerned, prompted the Eastern Partnership in 2009, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008, and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in 2007.

The Eastern Partnership is a joint initiative for the countries of Eastern Europe that are not yet members of the EU. It includes Belarus, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. This is a heterogeneous group of countries whose only common connection is having belonged to the dissolved Soviet Union and being located in Europe, the last three in the Caucasus area.

This initiative's objective is to further the advancement of the consolidation of the rule of law in these countries, the creation of cooperation networks in free trade and institutional cooperation, and the creation of relationships at national, regional, local and civil society levels, as well as promoting cultural exchanges and encouraging the movement of goods and people (EUEA, 2018a).

Of these countries, it is perhaps Belarus (EUEA, 2018b) that presents the most difficulties in its progress towards a fully democratic regime with full respect for human rights.

The programs with Ukraine (EUEA, 2018c), Georgia (EUEA, 2018d), and the Republic of Moldova (EUEA, 2018e) have evolved very positively, obtaining advancement in many aspects. A significant matter, common to all three partners, is the EU's support for a peaceful solution to the territorial conflicts they experience that respects their territorial integrity. In all three cases, the conflicts are related to the Russian Federation.

Although the partnership program is progressing well, the case of Armenia (EUEA, 2018f) is exceptional. In 2015, Armenia joined the Russian-sponsored Eurasian Economic Union; its membership to this partnership is incompatible with the association agreements with the EU.

The scope of the Eastern Partnership's joint initiative programs seems to be moving towards better interrelationships between the EU and Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, and Georgia. Meanwhile, despite the different scopes, with Belarus and Armenia, they only seem to be evolving towards an improvement of the network of interrelationships that builds trust.

The internal conflicts, with the Russian Federation acting as an external actor, will make the progress of integrating Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, and Georgia into the EU challenging.

The UfM is another joint initiative with different characteristics from the ones previously described. This joint initiative is aimed at promoting economic integration between the EU and the 15 member countries of this forum that belong to the regions of North Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans (EUEA, 2018g).

In addition to the EU, the countries participating in this joint initiative are Albania, Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestinian National Authority, Tunisia, and Turkey. Syria has been suspended, and Libya has observer nation status.

The nations participating in this initiative are far more heterogeneous than the previous ones. The Balkan nations are engaged in the process of integration into the EU, which is a more far-reaching commitment than only strengthening common trade. Turkey's position towards the EU has already been discussed.

Lastly, the participation of Israel and the Palestinian National Authority in this forum is consistent with the policy of establishing collaborative links in any field that allows it.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) / Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe defines itself as a forum for dialogue on issues affecting security in Europe through confidence-building among states. It also provides a framework for addressing the issues of common security, democratization, freedom, respect for minorities, and a wide range of other issues related to human development and the well-being of the European people.

If we look at its structures and treaties, this organization would not be considered a cooperative security system. However, an examination of its background and activities may change this initial perspective. The end of the Second World War in Europe, the Cold War, and the division of the continent into two opposing blocks caused two problems that remained unresolved until the early 1970s. The first was the recognition of the borders drawn after the end of the war; the second was Germany's

political situation, defeated, divided, and occupied by the powers that were initially allied and then opposed.

The idea of holding a conference at which all the nations of Europe, the United States, and Canada could participate on an equal footing emerged in 1955. During this conference, the issue of borders and the mutual recognition of the situation of the two German republics would finally be closed.

It was not until 1970-1972 that the Federal Republic of Germany signed a series of treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic that the conditions were right for the organization of this conference. Once these source issues were resolved, the preparatory work began in November 1972 in Helsinki, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was held in July 1973.

The declaration following the Budapest summit in December 1994 was named *Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era* (CSCE, 1994). It was the first to expressly mention cooperative security as the foundation of common European security.

The conclusions of this summit were again attuned with the January 1994 *Declaration at the Brussels Summit* of NATO, in which the CSCE was recognized as the only organization, explicitly using this term, that brings together all the states in Europe and North America. It was an instrument of preventive diplomacy for conflict prevention, cooperative security, and advancement in democracy and human rights (OTAN, 1994).

The Alliance also recognizes that the framework for talks on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe and the discussion of confidence-building measures should be the CSCE. This conference also provided the appropriate framework for the development of measures for the democratization of European countries. Clearly, the CSCE has played an important role as a meeting forum; it is considered to be one of the keys to confidence-building. Eleven years after the Istanbul summit, the Astana summit was held in December 2010 in Kazakhstan under the theme “Towards a security community” (OSCE, 2010). During the summit, the principles developed since 1975 and mainly in the 1990s were reaffirmed.

The CSCE/OSCE has evolved slowly in the organizational field. It was born as a forum for dialogue in 1972, and after twenty years of work, it has acquired permanent structures and adopted an organizational format. It has always maintained the possibility for all its members to discuss conflict resolution within the CSCE/OSCE, making progress in terms of political-military, human, and economic solutions to create a common, cooperative security space in Europe, North America, the Mediterranean, and Central Asia.

Proof of the previous may be the future of the new disarmament talks, which, in the light of the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (Ministerio

de Asuntos Exteriores de la Federación de Rusia, 2016), will assuredly have the OSCE as its framework.

Despite its transformation into an organization and the establishment of some permanent structures, its character as a forum is not discounted; its members are not linked to the organization with the integrative measures that exist in other organizations.

The missions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

OSCE missions are covered by the Charter of Paris and can be applied to every stage of a conflict, from prevention to stabilization, as well as monitoring to avoid replication. The tasks involved can cover all three dimensions of co-operative security that we have analyzed through the evolution of the organization.

Its first missions coincided with the outbreak of the crisis in the Balkans. In 1992, the then CSCE deployed observers in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandžak (Serbia) in what became known as the Long Duration mission.

To date, since their activation, CSCE/OSCE missions have been present in almost every conflict in Europe. Their action is not executive; they act based on agreements to monitor the implementation of ceasefires, to observe and report on a specific situation in a conflict zone (treatment of refugees, ethnic cleansing), or act on issues not related to the political-military dimension of a conflict that can facilitate its resolution.

Minsk Group. In 1992, the CSCE was asked to convene a conference on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at which Armenia and Azerbaijan could negotiate a peace agreement. At the 1994 Budapest Summit, it was decided to give the group continuance, which continues its work.

Missions in Southeastern Europe. In Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the province of Kosovo, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia, their efforts were mainly directed to the improvement of the political and human dimensions, with actions in the institutional improvement in legislation, human rights, freedom of expression, police, legislative initiatives, and developments in the judicial field. Most have remained in Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, and the province of Kosovo.

Missions in Eastern Europe. There are two missions in Ukraine. One involves civilian observers, responsible for monitoring the ceasefire in the provinces of Donetsk and Lugansk, and the border posts with the Russian Federation. The second seeks to develop projects to ensure a stable and democratic future in the country. The activities are very varied, covering legislative aspects such as constitutional, legal and criminal reform, human rights and legal education, reform of the security and defense sector

for democratic control, the fight against organized crime with a focus on cybercrime and trafficking in human beings, environmental protection (particularly important given the case of Chernobyl), freedom of the media, the promotion of good governance, and gender equality.

In the Republic of Moldova, this mission, in addition to institution-building and social development, similar to that in Ukraine, focuses on monitoring the peace process signed in 1992 between the authorities of the republic and the rebels in the Transnistrian region, as well as on measures to achieve a stable solution.

Missions in the South Caucasus. The missions in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, and the assistance group to Chechnya, now closed and completed, involved monitoring the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Chechnya, as well as institutional reforms related to democracy, respect for minorities, refugees, and human rights.

Missions in Central Asia. With presence in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, they address security issues, such as arms control; border management; counter-terrorism; human, arms, and drug trafficking; economic and environmental issues, and issues related to human rights, good governance, the rule of law, elections, and freedom of press. Lastly, they deal with economic issues such as the promotion of cross-border markets and liberalized economic areas.

Conclusions

The main concern is that, if we lean towards excessive security in Eastern Europe,

[...] focusing on the Russian threat, will result in us forgetting about the threats we face in the south. The terrorist attacks in Europe have directly affected central European countries. The migratory crises resulting from the conflicts on the southern periphery of Europe, together with other problems such as those related to organized crime, border management, or the need to stabilize the peripheral countries have changed, to the benefit of the postulates of the southern states, the perception of security of all the citizens of the Union. (Ceseden, 2018, p. 6)

The international situation has changed considerably since the possibilities of cooperative security began to be studied, and the foundations were prepared through the organizations that could develop them.

The certainty that the catastrophe of the two World Wars is something that cannot be repeated, as well as the lessons learned from the failures of the security systems in place during the immediate post-war period, led to the emergence of incipient collaborative structures. The hostility between the two dominant blocs and the clear identification of the first cooperative security structures with the bloc that defended

liberal democracy limited their growth and expansion. The significant step that was taken in the middle of the Cold War that brought together all the actors with interests in European security in the same forum is noteworthy. The implementation of the European Union's Security and Defense Policy, which addresses the new risks and threats to EU countries, is urgent and necessary. In this sense, Permanent Structured Cooperation, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, plays a relevant role, as it offers the possibility for some EU countries to strengthen their military collaboration.

Moreover, it is important to mention that this policy denotes strategic and interest independence from the NATO structure. This characteristic is relevant because almost the same states integrate the two organizations; however, their interests are different. It is also worth noting that the Atlantic Alliance includes states that are outside the European continent, with different interests and visions of security.

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